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Ali Burak Güven 
 
 
 This chapter examines Turkey’s democratic development from a political economy 
perspective. It observes that, from a historical viewpoint, the current interplay of economic 
and political phenomena in Turkey is atypical and problematic. In most of its multiparty 
history Turkey has exhibited fairly consistent and often predictable patterns of 
correspondence between policy strategies, dominant societal preferences, and underlying 
institutional arrangements, alternating between boom-and-bust cycles of growth accompanied 
by persistent, if staccato, democratic progress. The current period of relative economic 
stagnation and democratic backpedalling is unusual. 
 Yet despite this atypical pattern we should not lose sight of the overwhelming 
evidence in support of the positive long-term correlation between economic and political 
development, between qualitative increases in national wealth and the democratization of 
national politics. While there are different interpretations of this correlation, at a minimum it 
suggests that the structural impediments to Turkey’s economic development cannot be good 
for its democracy in the long run. The most important of these impediments is the country’s 
deepening middle-income trap, which in fact offers ample insight into the current juncture of 
democratic relapse. The inability to move beyond the middle-income range, it is argued, is 
both politically conditioned and complicates Turkey’s democratic prospects. The point is 
consistent with Merkel’s (2014) framework of “embedded democracy” as discussed in the 
editors’ introduction, for he argues economic conditions (and social justice) provide the 
broadest context of democratic deepening.   
The study of the interconnection between the economic and the political has a 
distinguished history, and the discussion begins with introducing three fundamental research 
directions in this tradition relevant to the question of democracy. This is followed by a brief 
account of Turkish democracy and economic development until the turn of the century, 
paying special attention to the interplay of distributive and policy trajectories. The third 
section examines the contemporary, post-2002 context, with a focus on both internal and 
external dynamics. It is in this otherwise brief period that we see most clearly the 
synchronous rise and fall of the country’s democratic and economic fortunes, as discussed in 
the fourth section. Here we also note a disconcerting recent tendency to institutional 
deterioration at an unprecedented scale, which is strongly implicated in the country’s current 
economic slowdown.  
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1. Political Economy, Development and Democracy 
 
Political economy as a cross-disciplinary field rests on a simple premise: There is 
often such a close connection between politics (the collective organization of social life) and 
the economy (the provision of our material conditions of existence) that studying these two 
realms in conjunction can be useful to make sense of various social phenomena. This premise 
has inspired various research directions for the study of democracy, although only three will 
be introduced here. First, at the macro level, economic and political systems might be 
correlated. Second, at the micro level, most political economists study things that either 
equally belong to both realms (consider tax policy) or things that belong to one realm but 
influence the other profoundly (consider inflation). Finally, the intensified integration of 
national economies over the past few decades has had worldwide implications for democracy.   
The first theme is the source of the common belief in the affinity between capitalism 
and democracy. One well-trodden path is to look for causal arrows running from the 
economic to the political, suggesting capitalist development facilitates democratic rule. 
Researchers in this camp often painstakingly qualify their theories to stave off the simplistic 
implication that wealth is sufficient condition for democracy. Barrington Moore’s classic 
tome, The Social Origins of Dictatorship of Democracy (1966), is famous for its formula “no 
bourgeoisie, no democracy”, but in fact his explanatory framework centres on the political 
effects of inter-class dynamics during early industrialization. Other well-known works that 
stipulate a path from capitalism to democracy are equally careful to emphasize the specificity 
of the European trajectory (Macpherson 1965; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992).  
The opposite path, looking for causality running from democracy to wealth, is lately 
more popular as it has proved empirically more viable. After all, there is not a single low-
income democracy in the world.1
The alternative to both paths is to look for a possible mutual reinforcement of 
democracy and capitalist enrichment. This notion was central to early postwar scholarship. 
Daniel Lerner (1958) considered modernization a holistic transformation that involved 
urbanization, increases in literacy, and changes in social values, whereas Gunnar Myrdal 
(1957) proposed ‘circular cumulative causation’ as the best-equipped approach to capture the 
multi-dimensional changes gripping developing countries. The Human Development Theory, 
explored by Yeşilada and Noordijk (in this volume), also advances a holistic view, exploring 
possible correlations between capitalist development, political liberalism and social values.  
 This realisation has in turn been used to expand the scope 
of economic policy advice. From the mid-1990s onwards, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank have shifted their attention to include items formerly unfamiliar to 
economists’ toolkits, such as the rule of law and good governance—all closely related to the 
quality of democracy (e.g. World Bank 2002). This reorientation was informed by economic 
analysis that identified the quality of institutions as a potential determinant of economic 
performance (e.g. North 1990), which continues strongly to this day, best known perhaps for 
a growing preoccupation with ‘inclusive institutions’ (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). 
Democracy, in this formulation, is a necessary condition for economic development.  
Few political economists today work on such macro phenomena. Most scholars 
specialize in micro and medium-range questions. These are obviously too many to list here, 
so I will address just two broad topics pertinent to the study of democracy in late developers 
such as Turkey: modes of interest intermediation and distributive politics. On the issue of 
interest intermediation, the literature on developing countries has long maintained that ideal-
typical interest group politics is seldom the case. Many developing polities suffer from 
pathologies related to both the aggregation of collective interests and from non-transparent 
ties between the state and social interests. Clientelism, state capture, and graft are rampant in 
these contexts, undermining the growth of impartial and capacious bureaucracies. Empirical 
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research, by contrast, shows that development-friendly policies are accompanied by a 
coherent bureaucratic structure that maintains close ties with societal interests while acting 
independently—a condition Peter Evans (1995) termed “embedded autonomy.” We will 
return to this question of bureaucracy and state-society relations in the fourth section.  
Equally important is the distribution of economic resources. Although the term 
“distributive politics” has overwhelmingly negative connotations in American political 
science, and is often seen as code for clientelism (e.g. Stokes et al. 2013), most political 
economists subscribe to a broader understanding. They see distributive politics as rooted in 
social inequality, with profound implications for inter- and intra-class relationships and 
thereby for democratic transitions (Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Haggard and Kaufman 
2012). The salience of distributive issues also means that policymakers have a built-in 
preference for growth-oriented policies: the larger the pie, the greater the leeway to manage 
distributive conflicts, through populist side-payments if necessary. Policy paths that both 
facilitate stable growth and allow ample discretion for redistribution are thus extremely 
precious for politicians, as we will discuss in relation to Turkey in the third section. 
Finally, the rapid integration of national markets since the 1970s has produced an 
outpouring of research, transforming ‘international political economy’ (IPE) from a niche 
literature into a massive scholarly field. Amongst the numerous insights IPE can offer into 
the study of democracy worldwide, two stand out as particularly relevant here. First, from the 
1990s onwards, many scholars began suspecting that globalization, to the extent that it 
constrained the policy autonomy and capacity of states, also undermined democracy. In turn 
rising actors of this new era, from multinational corporations to international and 
supranational organizations, suffered from varying levels of democratic deficit (Held 1997). 
This global context put developing countries at a particular disadvantage. Fragile 
democracies were sorely tested as premature exposure to global markets triggered financial 
crises that bred political instability, the neoliberal reordering of production and investment 
regimes strained preexisting distributive contracts, and the global South appeared shut out 
from decisionmaking in platforms of global economic governance such as the IMF and the 
WTO. Only countries with extensive social safety nets were able to put global integration in 
the service of democratic strengthening (Rudra 2005). Yet despite these visible challenges, 
the 1980s and 1990s were surprisingly good decades for democratization, with significant 
overall progress recorded in Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and Latin America.   
The 2000s ushered in a considerably different juncture. Unprecedented increases in 
trade and liquidity earlier in the decade, followed by the relatively limited damage the 
developing world incurred during the global financial crisis of 2008-9, contributed to a long 
stretch of economic catching-up by the leading countries of the global South. Yet the 
improved economic fortunes of developing and emerging countries did not seem to translate 
into concrete democratic gains, as illustrated by the Chinese and Russian examples (de 
Mesquita and Downs 2005). A few countries, especially in Latin America, consolidated their 
transitions, and some sub-Saharan African nations fared better, but resilience of authoritarian 
systems and persistence of hybrid regimes have proved to be more common patterns, a trend 
further accentuated by the failed transitions in the Middle East and numerous instances of 
democratic backpedalling elsewhere. It would seem the twenty-first century thus far does not 
fit the long-term historical pattern of convergence between democracy and prosperity.   
 
2. A Brief (Political-Economic) History of Turkish Democracy  
 
We have isolated three main vantage points from which political economists can 
reflect on democracy: a possible affinity between economic development and democracy; the 
preferences of collective interests and consequent distributive strains; and external factors, in 
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particular, patterns of integration with the international economy. To these, a fourth variable 
must be added in the Turkish context: the role of economic crises. 
Let us begin with this last one, for economic crises have served as important catalysts 
for policy and political change in Turkey (Kazgan 2005). Modern Turkish history is replete 
with examples of such crises triggering democratic breakdowns. The 1958 crisis was 
followed by the 1960 coup, and the debt crisis of 1977-78 had a detrimental impact in the run 
up to the 1980 takeover. Many believe that the 1997 intervention was in part conditioned by 
the 1994 shock. The 2001 crisis did not lead to a military takeover, but still wiped off the 
leading centre-right parties, paving the way for the rise of the AKP (Öniş and Keyman 2003).               
The suggestion here is not that the Turkish military perennially exploited economic 
hardships to realize its power ambitions. Rather, crises marked the exhaustion of existing 
economic policy regimes, rendering null the underlying political settlements and distributive 
coalitions, thus resulting in full-blown political crises (Öniş and Şenses 2007: 259-62). The 
1960 and 1980 coups were clear examples of this dynamic, with the military justifying its 
intervention not on economic but purely political grounds. Economic crises have other 
significance, such as serving as critical junctures for party-political reshuffling and often 
exposing the country to influence by external actors such as the IMF, but these do not 
connect with our query directly. One straightforward impact for democracy, though, is the 
sudden post-crisis increase in the authority of technocratic policymaking at the expense of the 
preferences of political incumbents, which should be registered as a core constraint in the 
aftermath of the 2001 crisis, as will be discussed later.  
For the political economist interested in the evolution of Turkish democracy, then, 
identifying the country’s successive economic policy regimes with their attendant distributive 
coalitions is a more central task than dwell on the political consequences of the crises that 
brought these regimes to an end. The point could not be overemphasized, especially given the 
unusual political-economic background of Turkey’s transition to multiparty politics in 1946. 
True, assuring American support in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War was a 
crucial motive for Turkey’s statist bureaucratic elite, which formed the backbone of the ruling 
Republican People’s Party (CHP), to engineer a swift transition to multiparty politics. But 
they were also calculating that such a move would help deflect growing opposition from a 
fledgling urban private sector and provincial landowners by harnessing support from workers 
and the peasantry for the statist, and potentially redistributive, elites. Seen this way, Turkey’s 
precocious “second wave” transition was in part devised as a peaceful way of resolving inter-
elite conflict (Waldner 1999: 58-60). 
Things did not go according to plan, as the Democratic Party (DP) won the 1950 
elections by unifying the gamut of rural interests (that is, large landowners, middle farmers, 
and smallholders) with the emergent private sector on a market-oriented platform. The goal 
was agriculture-based integration with the world economy riding on high post-war prices. In 
the meantime, a private sector-led industrialization drive was to take hold. Yet problems 
began to mount from the mid-1950s onwards, forcing the DP to respond with two distinct 
measures: populist redistribution (primarily toward the countryside via a expanding a 
generous agricultural support regime) and infant industry protection to compensate for lack of 
competitiveness. Within a short few years, the Turkish state was dragged right back into 
distributive relations and was forced to bolster its interventionist stance. 
The switch in the 1960s to import-substituting industrialization (ISI) was therefore a 
natural extension of the policy constraints that characterized the final years of the DP rule. 
The period 1962-1976 was remarkable in that it simultaneously recorded high growth rates (6 
percent on average) while ameliorating distributive strains under a mixed-economy model. In 
the background of this feat was a grand social compromise that joined together the interests 
of four crucial actors: the bureaucrats, the industrial bourgeoisie, organized labor, and the 
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peasantry. To the modernist bureaucratic elites, ISI would appeal in its continuation and 
systematization of pre-existing norms of state intervention, quelling their fears of 
disempowerment under electoral democracy (cf. Heper 1976). ISI was a good bargain for the 
industrialists as well, as it not only offered long-term protection from foreign competitors, but 
also came with incentives such as tax rebates and guaranteed access to foreign exchange.  
But in an open polity the fit between elite factions could not work without the consent 
of popular interests. Herein lay the significance of taking aboard organized labor and the 
peasantry. In a closed market, Turkey’s smallholders enjoyed relatively high support prices, 
which goes a long way in explaining why, as late as 1980, nearly 70 percent of Turkey’s 
workforce was in agriculture. Meanwhile their urban counterpart, organized labor, was 
concentrated in large private and public sector enterprises, and would greatly benefit from the 
liberal political atmosphere ushered in by the progressive 1961 constitution. From 1963 to 
1976, real wages in manufacturing more than doubled thanks mainly to union activism 
(Boratav 2003: 137).2
The problem with Turkey’s national developmentalist, mixed-economy regime was an 
unfortunate coupling of import dependence and lack of export competitiveness. The ensuing 
vulnerability to foreign exchange shortages began to haunt Turkish ISI not long after the first 
oil shock, culminating in a classic balance of payments crisis towards the end of the decade 
(Barkey 1990). In turn, Turkey’s market reformers in the early 1980s considered industrial 
export-oriented integration with the world economy a strategic priority above all else. 
Successive IMF and World Bank programmes were instrumental in this drive, advocating 
fiscal adjustment as well as trade and domestic financial liberalization in accordance with the 
orthodox neoliberal, Washington Consensus recipes of the time (Arıcanlı and Rodrik 1990). 
 This was an acceptable price to pay for private industry, given that 
high popular incomes, apart from keeping distributive tensions in check, also assured an ever 
expanding domestic market for consumer goods.  
Turkey’s first generation market reforms had been implemented under semi-
authoritarian rule, and at great cost to the popular interests that made up the ISI coalition. But 
the revival of competitive politics by the mid-1980s quickly transformed these pent-up 
grievances into strong redistributive pressures. Meanwhile, rapid integration with 
international financial markets following domestic financial liberalization offered a flexible 
context for managing fiscal deficits, thereby producing soft budget constraints to address 
demands from below. A succession of weak coalition governments throughout the 1990s 
responded favourably to these demands via populist increases in wages, salaries and 
agricultural prices, yet refused to undertake systematic improvements in economic 
governance. By the end of the decade, the Turkish economy displayed a series of interrelated 
ailments: chronic high inflation under soaring public debt, a highly exposed yet under-
regulated financial system, and sluggish industrial development, all implicated in 
unsustainable, boom-and-bust cycles of foreign capital-led growth. A badly-designed IMF 
program further aggravated Turkey’s downward spiral that ended in a combined banking and 
fiscal crisis in 2001 (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan 2000; Öniş and Rubin 2003).  
Two conclusions follow from this brief account spanning half a century. First, 
international economic factors had little direct role to play in the evolution of Turkish 
democracy in the latter half of the twentieth century. The most that can be surmised is that 
Turkey’s historically and geographically specific position in the international division of 
labour as a capitalist late developer did impact the composition of and the balance between 
various classes and class factions, but this impact was naturally highly mediated by initial 
conditions and contingent events on the ground, and cannot be delineated properly without 
fresh historical analysis. Encounters with the IMF, meanwhile, surely led to loss of policy 
autonomy, but hardly constituted the main obstacles to democratic institutionalization. 
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Second, and far more crucially, electoral democracy was used to good effect to 
manage the distributive strains associated with the tumultuous transformations in the Turkish 
economy. With both state-led and market-oriented economic strategies reliant on popular 
legitimacy, Turkish capitalism settled on a comparatively gentle, socially inclusive path, 
whereby political feasibility often trumped economic sustainability. This is not to suggest a 
rosy picture—neither were all collective interests democratically or effectively represented 
(e.g. Bianchi 1984; Heper and Keyman 1998), nor were there concerted efforts towards 
equitable income distribution (Boratav, Yeldan and Köse 2000). Nevertheless, sufficient 
resources were deployed to retain the acquiescence of rural and urban masses, and not just in 
the form of targeted side-payments but also through relatively early institutionalization of a 
range of public services in health, education and social security. 
Ironically, then, with plain electoralism sufficient to manage the potentially most 
explosive avenues of distributive conflict, the demand for further democratization was almost 
never articulated in terms of mass economic disadvantage. Rather, especially in the 1990s, 
challenges to Turkey’s limited democracy originated primarily from identity politics, that is, 
Islamist and Kurdish movements brewing in the straightjacket of official Turkish nation-
building (not that they were devoid of all economic underpinning). About the only clear-cut 
class-based demand for democratic consolidation in the 1990s came from the very top, that is, 
Istanbul-based big business organized under TÜSİAD (Öniş and Türem 2002), partly as an 
extension of their strategic support for Turkey’s potential EU membership.      
 
 
3. A Structural Transformation? 
 
The consequences of the 2001 crisis for Turkish economic policymaking and party 
politics were profound. The crisis illustrated conclusively the unsustainable character of 
Turkey’s half-hearted market opening; fiscal profligacy, regulatory laxity and an overall lack 
of macroeconomic coordination could not be tolerated any longer. From this understanding 
followed a series of IMF and World Bank-led programs with comprehensive institutional 
reform components. Charged with the implementation of this wide-ranging initiative was 
Kemal Derviş, a former World Bank vice-president called on duty by the incumbent coalition 
government. Meanwhile on the party-political front economic collapse further eroded the 
credibility of the main center-right and center-left parties, which had already been severely 
weakened by corruption scandals and sectarianism throughout the 1990s. The AKP rose to 
power in this extraordinary political context, securing a rare single-party majority 
government in the 2002 elections (Öniş and Keyman 2003). 
The party’s first term in office (2002-2007) was characterized oddly by both stringent 
external policy constraints and ample room for domestic political manoeuvring. Perceptions 
of continued economic vulnerability, combined with signs of robust recovery, rendered 
opposition to ongoing IMF and World Bank programmes unfeasible. A second set of 
constraints stemmed from the sudden progress made in Turkey’s EU candidacy bid, which 
prompted considerations of harmonization in various policy areas (Öniş and Bakır 2007). 
These dual external anchors resulted in a firm commitment to rebuilding the Turkish state’s 
economic arm on grounds of macroeconomic stability and enhanced regulatory capacity. 
On the political front, the AKP was not only blessed with a surprise parliamentary 
majority, but the agenda outlined above also compelled it to cobble together a broad reformist 
coalition. The party’s organic support base consisted of small and medium-sized 
entrepreneurs of the conservative Anatolian heartland, who felt systematically neglected 
during the heyday of state-directed developmentalism that favoured metropolitan big business 
(Gülalp 2001). On its path to power, the AKP had managed to combine the aspirations of this 
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class segment with the frustrations of the crisis-hit urban and rural poor under a wide 
conservative banner. But the externally-conditioned economic reform program it inherited 
from Derviş principally reflected the long-standing priorities of, first, Turkey’s industrial 
conglomerates and, second, the liberally-minded segments of the economic bureaucracy. 
The heterodox composition of this broad coalition on the one hand and an 
exceptionally favourable international economic context, on the other, allowed the AKP to 
implement the reforms selectively. In policy areas that mattered the most to external 
stakeholders and the domestic big business, such as banking regulation, fiscal discipline and 
central bank independence, the party genuinely strived to consolidate the reforms. In items 
that were somewhat less visible yet important to its original support base, however, it toed a 
more calculating line, especially from 2004 onwards. One example of the latter included the 
anti-corruption and public procurement reforms, the full implementation of which would 
have deprived the party of any opportunity to reward and nurture smaller, government-
aligned conservative capital factions via public contracts. Another pragmatically discarded 
initiative was the World Bank-led agricultural subsidy reform, the implementation of which 
would have made the AKP the first center-right party in Turkish history structurally unable to 
woo the rural vote via time-honoured populist side-payments. In both cases, reforms were 
first watered down and then gradually reversed (Güven 2012). 
If one reason why these gross deviations did not draw much criticism was the party’s 
continued commitment to some other vital reforms, a more crucial factor was an 
extraordinarily fortuitous global economic context marked by record increases in trade and 
capital flows that greatly facilitated Turkish economic performance. Provided reasonably 
wise economic policymaking, the good times floated all boats simultaneously, with low-
income and middle-income countries as a group growing at an annual average of 7.3 percent 
between 2002 and 2007. At 6.8 percent Turkish growth rates for that same period lagged 
slightly behind, yet were much higher than the country’s historic average of around 4 percent 
(World Bank, online). More important still for outside observers such as the IMF and the EU 
was the rapid improvement in Turkey’s macro balances, evident in a rapid decline in 
consumer inflation, a booming yet stable banking sector, and an increasingly sustainable debt 
burden. Add to this impressive record a revitalized commitment to mass privatization (Öniş 
2011) along with an unprecedented increase in foreign direct investment, and it becomes 
abundantly clear why the above transgressions did not cause much alarm. 
In hindsight, the AKP’s selective implementation of Turkey’s externally-conditioned 
post-2001 programme during its first term harboured a hybrid policy strategy that has 
continued, with minor exceptions, to this day: One side of this strategy involves commitment 
to an orthodox vision of macroeconomic stability to minimize the possibility of a classic 
banking or balance of payments crisis that brought down a great many governments in 
Turkish economic history. On the other side is the party’s desire to maximize its discretion 
over economic resources to both manage distributive strains from below through enhanced 
inclusiveness and offer preferential treatment to business interests with which it has been 
organically linked. Although this hybrid strategy worked reasonably well at first, it began 
throwing up serious challenges from 2007 onwards as the party consolidated its power 
domestically, and yet began facing a far less forgiving economic environment abroad. Let us 
examine these challenges briefly before discussing their implications for Turkish democracy 
more systematically in the next section. 
One significant challenge concerns the changing dynamics of state-business relations. 
While the second phase of market reforms in Turkey under AKP rule has amounted to a far 
deeper process of liberalization than in previous decades, the party’s indiscriminate 
popularity among business factions is no more as its relationship with big business, especially 
the old captains of industry, soured steadily in recent years. Tensions were already brewing 
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since 2006-7 due to loss of reformist momentum on the side of the government. A delayed 
and fairly limited response to the global financial crisis of 2008, which embraced neither a 
third successive deal with the IMF nor an early and vigorous stimulus plan as in many other 
countries, constituted the breaking point in relations (Öniş and Güven 2011). In the 
background of this decision were the two conditions introduced above, that is, continue an 
orthodox stance on fiscal-financial stability (thus dismiss the possibility of an ambitious 
stimulus effort in favour of a more modest and fiscally benign plan) while maintaining 
discretion over resource allocation (thus dismiss a potentially restrictive new deal with 
external agencies such as the IMF). By contrast, since the global crisis, government policy 
has openly favoured rising conservative capitalist groups, both structurally by offering 
incentives to sectors where these groups operate heavily such as retail and construction, and 
individually through the increasingly opaque allocation of state contracts. These efforts to 
nurture a dominant conservative business class in direct competition to Turkey’s 
conventionally secular big business establishment have inspired much recent research (e.g. 
Buğra and Savaşkan 2013). 
Another challenge that originated from the party’s dual strategy relates to its relations 
with popular interests. On the one hand, despite its commitment to fiscal discipline, the AKP, 
in the time-honoured tradition of all successful mass parties in Turkish political history, has 
also embraced redistributive side-payments as an instrument to preserve its popular 
legitimacy. As Sabri Sayarı (in this collection) explains, as a dominant single-party it used its 
“resource advantage” effectively. This, however, was a “controlled populism” (Öniş 2012) 
that resorted to both older avenues such as agricultural price supports and newer ones such as 
direct transfers to the poor under revamped social assistance schemes (Buğra and Candaş 
2011; Yentürk 2013). Equally important has been the party’s partial reliance on universal, 
rather than targeted, measures, such as improvements in social services, particularly in health 
care. A more extreme example of the latter is the rapid growth of financial markets over the 
past decade, expanding access to consumer credit with potentially positive welfare effects 
(e.g. accelerated home ownership). On the other hand, this contract with popular interests is 
sustainable only under continuous high economic performance. Generous fiscal outlays 
require high tax receipts in a growing economy. Credit expansion cannot be allowed to 
consistently outpace output growth at the risk of creating perilous structural imbalances. Seen 
this way, the performance of the past few years is not encouraging. Sluggish growth 
averaging 3 percent per year since 2012 along with chronic high unemployment hovering 
around 10 percent calls into question the feasibility of the AKP’s mass political appeal.                         
A final challenge is rooted in the main omission of the AKP’s hybrid strategy: 
development. A key problem with Turkish political economy in the past 15 years is the 
replacement of the national developmentalism of the preceding half-century with orthodox 
fisco-financial stability as the main counterpart of distributive politics in a larger societal 
settlement. It is therefore no surprise that, transformations in politics and policy aside, the 
structure of the Turkish economy and thereby Turkey’s position in the wider international 
economy have remained virtually unchanged under AKP rule. In fact, the problem goes 
beyond the past decade and a half: After 35 years of experimentation with freeing and 
opening markets, Turkey still features a private consumption-oriented model of growth 
characterized by weak domestic savings and dependence on foreign capital, manifested in 
perennially high current account deficits—the very problem that triggered the collapse of 
Turkish ISI in the first place (Taymaz and Voyvoda 2012; Halıcıoğlu 2012). In the 
background of this model is not what Turkey can do but what it cannot: high-tech, high 
value-added, preferably export-oriented industrialization, which for the past two hundred 
years has been the only consistently proven catch-up strategy for large economies.   
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4. Democratic Development under Middle-Income Trap 
 
Turkish economic performance over the past few years is considerably less impressive 
in comparison to the mid-2000s. In making sense of this shift in fortunes, one cannot dismiss 
the impact of sea changes in the international economy. Just as a fortuitous global context 
helped the high growth performance of 2002-07, so the continued external hardships 
following the global crisis would in part account for the significant deceleration in Turkish 
growth rates to an annual average of just 3.3 percent in 2008-14 (Table 1).  
 
 
<           INSERT TABLE 1 APPROX. HERE          > 
 
 
Yet problems inherent in Turkish economic structure and strategy are equally to 
blame. In fact, there is a broad consensus among economists today that Turkey has been 
caught in what is called the “middle-income trap”—an economy’s prolonged inability to 
proceed into the high per capita income range, which the World Bank currently sets at 
US$12,276. Arbitrary though this figure may seem, the large number of countries hovering 
around the US$10,000-15,000 threshold (in current US dollars) for long periods indicates 
otherwise (cf. Eichengreen, Park and Shin, 2013).3
Let us now consider each of these three areas—that is, industrial policy, which 
primarily concerns state-business relations; human capital, which primarily concerns relations 
with popular interests; and institutional quality, which primarily concerns legal and 
bureaucratic organization. In none of these areas can we currently observe strategies geared 
towards overcoming the country’s growth stagnation. Rather, ruling preferences in each of 
these areas exhibit severe negative implications for the quality of democracy. Turkey’s 
deepening middle-income trap is thus accompanied by its democratic backpedalling.  
 This inability is down primarily to the 
stagnancy of a country’s production profile, that is, what a developing economy specializes in 
producing and at what level of productivity, which in turn translates into a broadly favourable 
or unfavourable overall terms of trade in the international economy. Continued urbanization 
or capital investment are seldom sufficient for the sorts of breakthrough in production profile 
that could offer a pathway out of middle-income. Rather, most economists would suggest that 
such breakthroughs would entail shifts in industrial strategy (including an emphasis on 
research and development with corresponding incentives), advancements in ‘human capital’ 
(cultivation of skills and educational attainment for higher labour productivity and 
innovation), and structural improvements in institutional quality (including government 
effectiveness, transparency, the legal system and so on).  
First, to begin with state-business relations, improving Turkey’s production profile 
would require steering firms towards higher value-added sectors via smart industrial policy. 
But although Turkey has in place various R & D supports, and despite extensive talk of a 
need for technological upgrading,4 it is widely acknowledged that government policy in 
recent years has strategically prioritized nurturing conservative groups with organic links to 
the party against the old industrial conglomerates. The problems with this stance with respect 
to economic strategy are obvious: First, coming from the relative margins of Turkish 
capitalism, conservative groups are concentrated in sectors such as construction, energy and 
retail. With little, if any, presence in high-tech manufacturing, they cannot be expected to 
substantively contribute to Turkey’s industrial upgrading any time soon. Second, Turkish big 
business against which the rising conservative groups position themselves is indeed very 
small compared to the size of the Turkish economy. Consider, for instance, that the only 
Turkish company on the Fortune500 Global list in 2014 was Koç Holding at 341st place, 
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operating in numerous sectors from auto manufacturing to banking, energy, retail and 
consumer durables. Politically discriminating in favour of even smaller firms cannot possibly 
bring about national champions to carry forward an upgrading drive.  
The overt favouritism that has come to characterize state-business relations exacts 
serious political costs as well. The main problem here is the reversal of some important gains 
of Turkish modernization, however limited they were. Turkey has had its fair share of graft 
and cronyism in the past, but the scale of corruption and collusion exposed over the past few 
years has no precedent. Accompanying this is a generalized deterioration in ‘stateness’, 
ranging from the chronic decline of meritocracy in public appointments to the open 
politicization of Turkey’s ‘autonomous’ regulatory agencies, loss of transparency in 
economic decisionmaking, and the particularly sorry state of the judiciary following the 
AKP’s recent rift with the Gülen movement. All these trends could be considered traumatic 
to political development and an affront to democracy, and yet they are also instrumental in 
nurturing a government-friendly business class. Rising through the ranks of this class are 
businessmen who control numerous TV stations and newspapers unabashedly toeing the AKP 
line, while others that rely on investment supports and/or public tenders may simply be 
complicit in their acquiescence. What is certain is that the conservative business interests 
closely aligned with the government have no unqualified demand for democratic 
consolidation, and many may indeed have more to lose than gain in the short run if Turkey 
somehow meaningfully resumed the good governance and anti-corruption reforms it had 
started in the immediate aftermath of the 2001 crisis.        
 Second, relations with popular classes are afflicted with similar problems. The AKP’s 
approach to societal well-being has been ambiguous to say the least. On the one side is the 
image of an inclusive neoliberalism that extends the scope of social assistance programs, 
improves public services, and on the whole continues the Turkish right’s rather uncanny 
distributive sensibilities (Bozkurt 2013). On the other side is an extreme form of neoliberal 
greed whose barbarian exploitation of land and labour is comparable only to early Victorian 
capitalism, as manifested in the catalogue of neglects in workplace safety and a relentless 
assault on the environment that tend to spark violent clashes with local inhabitants. Close 
observers of the Turkish context will note that the latter transgressions are frequently related 
to operations of the rising conservative capital factions discussed above.  
 If escaping the country’s middle-income trap requires improving ‘human capital’, the 
picture outlined above suggests that the government strategy towards society at large has 
been missing this particular component. Confusion over official classifications aside, most 
observers would agree that improved social programs and public services have meant 
progress in poverty alleviation. Yet when it comes to cultivating a workforce endowed with 
skills supportive of driving up productivity and innovation, then Turkey represents a failure. 
PISA scores are stagnant, and while tertiary enrolment spiked, it is often acknowledged that 
quality has not caught up. Besides, some technical fields and most basic sciences crucially 
important for industrial upgrading suffer from chronic undersupply.    
 This state of affairs is hardly conducive to democratic consolidation. For Turkey’s 
poor, the expanded social programmes are little more than a massive exercise in constituency 
clientelism. Rather than enshrined in citizenship rights, or reflected in well-institutionalized 
tri-partite arrangements that also clarify obligations of third parties (read, employers) and are 
enforceable via collective action, improvements in the circumstances of Turkey’s popular 
classes seem increasingly tied to political discretion. Growing dependence on the types of 
side-payments that no longer lie within the realm of productive relations and can easily 
vanish at the first government change in turn breeds a culture of acquiescence and 
disincentive to dissent. And the political counterpart of buying the consent of the working 
poor is to crush any resistance from disaffected middle and upper-middle classes. In fact, one 
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important outcome of the government response to the Gezipark protests was the further 
alienation of the country’s educated workforce. A government genuinely committed to 
industrial upgrading would be looking to prop up the ranks of these youth rather than 
demeaning them in perhaps the most revealing episode of Turkey’s recent authoritarian slide.  
 Third, development economics in recent decades has placed much emphasis on 
institutional quality. Whereas Douglass North’s (1990) widely known formulations conceived 
institutions as “the rules of the game” and prioritized their “adaptive efficiency” rather than 
suitability for particular purposes, current scholarship and policy advice are both wider in 
scope and specific in content (e.g. Rodrik 2000; 2006). Thus, on the one side there is greater 
appreciation of broad institutions such as the rule of law, property rights, political 
accountability, transparency, and bureaucratic quality. On the other side are fairly narrow 
institutions related to individual policy domains, such as central bank independence, financial 
regulations, public expenditure regime, and various other sectoral arrangements. Although 
some assumptions and policy extensions of this ‘institutional turn’ in economics have 
attracted much criticism (e.g. Przeworski 2004), on the whole few scholars today would 
doubt that institutions, however defined, have important consequences for economic 
performance.               
In that regard, Turkey since the late 2000s has experienced fairly rapid institutional 
deterioration. Some signs of this tendency have already been mentioned in the above 
discussion of state-business relations. What needs emphasizing here is that this deterioration 
has been across the board, encompassing both broad and narrow institutions. Consider, with 
reference to broad institutions, the publicly very well-known corruption scandals of late 2013 
concerning four AKP ministers, which so far went unprosecuted despite incontrovertible 
evidence. The counterpart of this tendency on the side of narrow institutions is the public 
procurement regime and the affiliated government agency; rules and regulations in this 
critically important area have been revised so often and so flexibly at times that it is 
frequently reported that irregularities are difficult to even identify.      
 The problem with institutional deterioration is of course not the mere price of graft in 
terms of damage to public purse—although recent ‘rumours’ regarding large revolving loans 
by public banks to several pro-government business groups are fairly grim (Sağlam 2015). In 
the current Turkish context institutional weaknesses of this kind have come to directly 
undermine economic performance. One major impact concerns business climate and 
confidence. Strong perceptions of widespread corruption, deficient rule of law and poor 
governance serve as strong disincentives against investment decisions, foreign as well as 
domestic. To the extent poor governance is seen as a steady state, periods of economic and/or 
political uncertainty, as has been the case in much of 2015, become so much more difficult to 
endure. Not only investments are deferred but the cost of lending increases, posing a 
particularly hefty problem for the Turkish economy given its persistent foreign deficits. 
Another important cost of institutional deterioration for economic performance is 
through direct loss of capacity, which is just as difficult to replace as actors’ confidence. A 
decline in government effectiveness in a particular policy domain due to, for example, 
favouritism in staff appointments or sheer decision-making is bad enough. Yet developments 
over the past few years indicate that this decline in effectiveness now stifles core 
organizations of economic governance to the point of endangering macroeconomic stability. 
Central bank independence has been badly eroded due to incessant public criticism by 
Erdoğan and several AKP ministers of the potential use of interest rate hikes as a monetary 
policy instrument. Meanwhile attempts at macroprudential reforms after the global crisis 
exposed the limited powers of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, with the 
initiative eventually requiring involvement of none other than the Central Bank. In addition, a 
major disagreement that erupted amongst the ranks of the government regarding whom to 
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appoint as the Undersecretary of the Treasury left the organization without a head for most of 
2014. Finally, successive elections in 2014 and 2015 saw a considerable expansion in fiscal 
outlays—quite uncharacteristic of the AKP pre-2011. The party’s commitment to fiscal-
financial stability and macroeconomic prudence appears to have mostly vanished, evident 
also in the political marginalization of the stability-conscious and outward-looking Ali 
Babacan, who during his long tenure at the helm of the economy had largely continued on the 
path opened up by Kemal Derviş.    
Finally, the international context today is supportive of neither an economic nor 
democratic breakthrough in Turkey. Emerging countries weathered the global storm better 
than rich democracies in 2008-9, but conditions have deteriorated markedly since 2012 as 
recovery began to take hold in the North. The rest of the decade is expected to continue this 
uninspiring trend, with a return to the globally fat years of the AKP’s golden age highly 
improbable. And although qualitative improvements in productivity and competitiveness take 
a long time to bear fruit, from the Middle East to Russia and the eurozone, the current 
economic prospects for Turkey’s main export partners are hardly encouraging for Turkey to 
invest too heavily in a costly industrial upgrading drive. Meanwhile politically, the absence 
of the IMF since 2008 and to some extent the weakening of the EU anchor both represent a 
welcome freeing up of national sovereignty. However, their departure from active duty in 
Turkey also means a clear lack of direct external incentives for improving governance and 
institutional quality, and one less hurdle each on the path of any incumbent willing to bend 
democracy and the rule of law.      
 
5. A Time to Decide? 
 
Returning to the main theme introduced at the outset of this chapter, the well-
researched affinity between economic and political development finds another positive 
identification in Turkey. Not only does our account start with a relatively poor autocracy and 
end in a country snapshot that is more democratic and prosperous, but it also suggests that 
periods of political opening and economic progress did often overlap (the 1960s and the 
2000s, in particular). From this long-term perspective it is obvious that the current juncture 
constitutes a particularly glum episode, bearing all the hallmarks of simultaneous economic 
and political exhaustion. Turkey has been caught deep in a middle-income trap, aggravated 
further by exclusionary state-society relations and institutional weakening in a context of 
democratic backpedalling.  
What to make of this gloomy picture? Two points: First, the odd thing about both 
democracy and prosperity is that we often assume both are desirable to the maximum; we do 
not ask whether societies might be content with a certain level of freedom or wealth at a 
given time. The question is relevant in the Turkish context as the country has made relatively 
substantial progress in both domains over the past two decades, and yet in both also seems to 
have reached the limit of what can be accomplished without major transformation in multiple 
related areas. Other chapters in this collection point out various structural (micro and macro) 
impediments to consolidation of Turkish democracy. For economic development, it is the 
middle-income trap that is the final frontier—crossing on the other side of the border requires 
building a different economic (and quite possibly political) organization, with unknown costs. 
However, what those of us who think such breakthroughs should happen, that democracies 
should be consolidated, that economies should reach high-income level, rarely consider is 
that the current economic or political status quo may well be sustainable. It is likely many 
Turkish citizens (just as many Russian or Chinese citizens) are content with their improved 
circumstances they themselves observed within their lifetimes, and are unwilling to risk much 
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for further improvement. Acknowledging that possibility is analytically liberating as it allows 
studying existing dynamics without having to consider their suitability for a possible future.  
At a related and more concrete level, we should be mindful of the magnitude of 
changes experienced in countries such as Turkey. While it is true that overall patterns (such 
as growth strategy or position in the international division of labour) remained more or less 
stable, the tumultuous paths of actors and institutions in short periods of time can produce 
strong public and policy incentives to merely keep things together. I suspect this may have 
been one motive behind Turkey’s relatively inert economic strategy for the past few years, 
with implications for democracy. The staying power of this motive is unknown. Turkey is 
not, as the cliché goes, “at a crossroads”, nor exactly are most emerging powers. Turkish 
economy and democracy both have the option of continuing as is for a while, that is, 
exhausted but not imploded, rather than force ordinary citizens into a decision as to how 
much they are willing to risk sacrificing to make a breakthrough in either domain. After all, a 
faulty democracy stuck in the upper middle-income range is not the worst Turkey has seen.         
    
 
NOTES 
 
1 See https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-
2015#.VZgMMUa1OK8; http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups 
(accessed 02 July 2015). In fact, the only lower middle-income free countries are Guyana, 
India and Senegal. The remaining 87 “free” countries are either in the upper middle-income 
or in the high-income range.  
1 Keyder (1987: 161) notes that “wage levels in Turkish manufacturing…were considerably 
higher than warranted by the relative level of GNP per capita. For example, in 1977 the 
average daily wage in Turkey was $11.14; this compared with $11.72 in Greece, $20.44 in 
France and $23.56 in Britain. Per capita incomes in these countries were two and a half, six 
and four times the Turkish levels respectively. (…) [I]n 1974 Turkish manufacturing wages 
were three times the level of Korean wages. In 1977 they were double, and in 1979, despite 
very rapid increases in Korea, still 50 per cent higher.”   
1 Note that Turkish GDP per capita ranged between US$8,500 and US$10,800 since 2008, 
depending primarily on exchange rate fluctuations. In 2015-17 it is expected to hover around 
US$9,000. For debates on Turkey’s middle-income trap, see Yeldan et al. (2013) and World 
Bank (2014). Classic cases are found in Latin America (especially Brazil, Mexico and Peru) 
and South East Asia (especially Malaysia and Thailand).     
1 Most recently, in Fall 2014 a series of “priority transformation plans” were announced, 
comprising some 90 components and nearly 1,300 individual measures, yet at the time of this 
writing (Summer 2015) there is no discernable change in policy.    
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Table 1.  Turkey: Selected Indicators (2002-2014) 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
GDP (US$ Billions) 232.5 303 392.2 483 530.9 647.2 730.3 614.5 731.2 774.8 788.9 823.3 799.5 
GDP Per Capita (US$) 3,571 4,587 5,856 7,117 7,727 9,310 10,382 8,624 10,112 10,584 10,646 10,975 10,530 
GDP Growth (%) 6.2 5.3 9.4 8.4 6.9 4.7 0.7 -4.8 9.2 8.8 2.1 4.2 2.9 
Imports (US$ Billions) 51.5 69.3 97.5 116.8 139.6 170.1 202.0 140.9 185.5 240.8 236.5 251.7 242.2 
Exports (US$ Billions) 36.1 47.3 63.2 73.5 85.5 107.3 132.0 102.1 113.9 134.9 152.5 151.8 157.6 
Current Account Balance  (%GDP) -0.3 -2.5 -3.7 -4.6 -6.1 -5.8 -5.5  -1.97 -6.2 -9.7 -6.1 -7.9 -5.8 
FDI (US$ Billions) 0.6 0.7 1.1 8.1 17.0 18.4 14.7 6.2 6.2 14.2 10.1 9.3 8.5 
Fiscal Balance (%GDP) -11.4 -8.8 -5.4 -1.2 -0.6 -1.6 -1.8 -5.5 -3.6 -1.3 -2.0 -1.2 -1.3 
Total Public Debt (%GDP)  70.9 63.5 57.8 52.2 46.4 40.4 41.2 47.7 44.4 41.2 38.8 38.8 35.9 
Consumer Inflation % 45.0 18.4 9.4 7.7 9.7 8.4 10.1 6.5 6.4 10.4 6.2 7.4 8.2 
Unemployment % 10.3 10.5 10.3 10.6 10.2 10.3 11.0 14.0 11.9 9.8 9.2 9.7 9.9 
 
Sources: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey; TURKSTAT; World Bank
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